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INTRODUCTION 
Zoning is the quintessential wicked problem. Professors Rittel 
and Webber, writing in the 1970s, identified as “wicked” those problems 
that technocratic expertise cannot necessarily solve.1 Wicked problems 
arise when the very definition of the problem is contested and outcomes 
are not measured by “right and wrong” but rather by messier contests 
between winners and losers.2 This accurately characterizes the state of 
zoning and land use today. 
Zoning is under vigorous and sustained attack from all sides. 
Conservatives have long decried regulatory interference with private 
development rights.3 More recently, progressive housing advocates 
have begun to criticize zoning for making thriving cities unaffordable 
 
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Elisabeth H. & Granville S. Ridley, Jr. Chair in 
Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Zachary Gitman provided research assistance. 
 1. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 
POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–62 (1973). 
 2. Id. at 160–69. 
 3. See, e.g., Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719, 722 (1980) 
(“[W]e should try the alternative of less regulation and a better delivery system . . . .”); Orlando E. 
Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 263 (1984) 
(“[Land use] controls cut against the grain of our historical penchant to allow people (property 
owners) the freedom to use their property as they choose.”); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land 
Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 30–31 (1981) 
(contending that a free enterprise system of land development would be superior to the status quo 
because it would “confine government to the role of preserving order and fundamental liberties”). 
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and for exacerbating racial segregation.4 Environmentalists argue that 
zoning is responsible for urban sprawl and for increasing carbon 
emissions.5 Economists blame zoning for restricting residential 
mobility, which limits fluidity in labor markets and thereby reduces the 
agglomeration surplus that thriving places like New York and San 
Francisco should be producing.6 And these are just some of the concerns. 
The breadth of these criticisms reveals the multiplicity of issues 
implicated by modern zoning—from the balance of public power and 
private rights, to distributional concerns, environmental interests, 
economic efficiency, and externalities along many dimensions. Most do 
not admit of a single “right” answer. Zoning is a wicked problem, indeed. 
In true “wicked” fashion, it is difficult even to explore answers 
because of the predictable and entrenched interests in almost any 
zoning dispute. Invariably, efforts to loosen zoning restrictions in order 
to increase density will face fierce opposition from nearby neighbors 
who oppose change—so-called NIMBYs (“Not in My Back Yard”) or 
Neighborhood Defenders.7 Such neighbors typically object to changes to 
the character of their community, increased burdens on local 
infrastructure, changing demographics, community affordability, and 
change for its own sake. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Barriers to Shared 
Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents 1 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120_barriers_shared_growth_land_us
e_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TEW-JGF5] (“In today’s remarks, I will 
focus on how excessive or unnecessary land use or zoning regulations have consequences that go 
beyond the housing market to impede mobility and thus contribute to rising inequality and 
declining productivity growth.”); Paul Krugman, Opinion, Inequality and the City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/opinion/inequality-and-the-city.html 
[https://perma.cc/8TAA-MNL9] (“Yes, [zoning] is an issue on which you don’t have to be a 
conservative to believe that we have too much regulation.”); Matthew Yglesias, You Can’t Talk 
Housing Costs Without Talking About Zoning, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://slate.com/ 
business/2013/12/housing-costs-it-s-the-zoning-stupid.html [https://perma.cc/TAV6-TL9P] 
(describing the relationship between zoning and housing supply). 
 5. See SMART GROWTH IN A CHANGING WORLD (Jonathan Barnett ed., 2007); see also Michael 
P. Johnson, Environmental Impacts of Urban Sprawl: A Survey of the Literature and Proposed 
Research Agenda, 33 ENV’T & PLAN. A 717, 721–23 (2001) (reviewing research regarding the 
environmental impacts of urban sprawl); TRANSP. RSCH. BD., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., DRIVING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT: THE EFFECTS OF COMPACT DEVELOPMENT ON 
MOTORIZED TRAVEL, ENERGY USE, AND CO2 EMISSIONS 144–84 (2009) (arguing that land 
development patterns lead to increased automobile usage, thereby increasing greenhouse  
gas emissions). 
 6. See, e.g., Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
467, 469 (2018) (“Human beings should live in places where they are most productive, and 
megacities, where information, innovation, and opportunities congregate, would be the optimal 
choice.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 7. See KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK & MAXWELL PALMER, NEIGHBORHOOD 
DEFENDERS: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS 4, 34 (2020). 
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The resulting fights can be knock-down, drag-out affairs. 
Existing residents often oppose change as if the very survival of the 
neighborhood and community were at stake. Development proponents 
respond with accusations of “opportunity hoarding,” selfishness, and 
sometimes racism.8 Zoning is the battleground, and both sides act as if 
it reflects a zero-sum binary choice: more development or less, 
neighborhood transformation or preservation. It does not have to be this 
way. Both sides in these fights misapprehend the role that zoning can 
play in mediating these disputes. Zoning need not be either pro-growth 
or anti-growth. Instead, when properly understood and applied, zoning 
is a tool to moderate the pace of neighborhood change.9 
In the wicked problems literature, incremental change is viewed 
as a necessary compromise when problems are insurmountably 
complex. Where problems cannot be solved wholesale, actors are 
advised at least to whittle away.10 Yet some scholars argue that a 
wicked problem, by definition, is not amenable to incremental change.11 
One of the characteristics that makes problems “wicked” is their 
dynamic response to interventions, making piecemeal solutions 
impossible.12 But zoning should be viewed differently. Slow, 
incremental change is not a compromise because holistic solutions are 
impossible. Rather, it appropriately balances the interests of neighbors 
and newcomers; it is the best approach to neighborhood change, not a 
necessary evil. Understanding the importance of the pace of change 
ratchets down the stakes of zoning disputes and suggests a new 
conception of municipal land use regulations. 
 
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE 
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT 95–98, 102–05 (2017) (“The rise of ‘exclusionary zoning,’ designed to protect the home values, 
schools, and neighborhoods of the affluent, has badly distorted the American property market.”); 
see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. 
L. REV. 1647, 1655 (2016) (describing “opportunity hoarding”). For an eight-bit cartoon 
demonstration of the phenomenon, see Carrie Engel, Play the Dream Hoarders Game, BROOKINGS: 
BROOKINGS NOW (July 13, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/13/play-
the-dream-hoarders-game/ [https://perma.cc/D6R8-M26R]. 
 9. See Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(arguing that the purpose of modern zoning is to constrain the pace of neighborhood change). 
 10. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive 
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 65 (2010) 
(“The Court’s observation that agencies have to whittle away at some problems is no doubt 
accurate . . . .”). 
 11. See Falk Daviter, Coping, Taming or Solving: Alternative Approaches to the Governance 
of Wicked Problems, 38 POL’Y STUD. 571, 583 (2017) (“In the face of certain types of risks, for 
example, a strategy of incremental adjustments and reconstructive analysis may be ill-advised if 
it means to accept potentially irreversible repercussions.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Ian Sanderson, Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism, 
Evidence and Learning, 57 POL. STUD. 699, 705–06 (2009) (describing how complex systems cannot 
be understood by decomposing them to their constituent elements). 
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Many people seem to think that the goal of zoning is to identify 
optimal land development patterns and then regulate towards those 
outcomes.13 Disputes are then over the ultimate vision of the 
community and the density and intensity of allowable land uses.14 But 
change that happens slowly actually imposes fewer costs on neighbors 
than the same change over a shorter period of time. Slow, deliberate, 
incremental change interferes less with people’s expectations than does 
rapid, dramatic change—even if the end result is the same.15 
Neighborhood evolution affects people differently depending on the 
speed at which it occurs. 
Giving neighbors time for their expectations to shift 
incrementally can reduce the disruption caused by new development. 
Neighbor opposition to new projects is often vehement. Protests, 
community activism, and even litigation may try to stop a development 
in its tracks.16 But if the development happens, it may blend relatively 
quickly into the community background.17 People’s expectations shift, 
and what was once an affront to the character of the community can 
become a welcome addition, or at least part of the unnoticed 
background. Even more importantly, neighbor opposition to new 
development is sometimes based less on objections to the specific project 
than on concerns that it represents a kind of slippery slope. It is not the 
particular project that threatens the community but rather the 
additional changes that it foreshadows.18 
Zoning, when properly implemented and designed, should give 
communities time to absorb changes gradually and should provide 
reassurance to neighbors that one new project will not trigger other new 
ones too quickly. But zoning should facilitate change and not lock in the 
status quo. In other words, using zoning to moderate the pace of 
community change can act as a lubricant to some development by 
 
 13. See Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Post-zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land 
Use Controls, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2013) (describing ecological origins of “end-state” 
planning); see also Eric R. Claeys, Essay, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in 
Zoning, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 750 (2004) (“Because Progressives measured a city’s well being 
by the extent to which it was planned in advance, they saw nineteenth-century regulation as an 
invitation to anarchy.”). 
 14. See Serkin & Macey, supra note 13, at 308. 
 15. See Christopher Serkin, Property and Change (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
 16. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text (describing opposition to development of 
Barclays Center in Brooklyn). 
 17. See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (describing the subsequent community 
acceptance of the Barclays Center in Brooklyn). 
 18. Cf. Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 180–81 (N.Y. 
1986) (upholding challenged environmental review of development on grounds that the city failed 
to consider likely changes in the neighborhood as a result). 
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lowering the stakes for community opposition and protecting incumbent 
expectations. People should not expect zoning to prevent change, but 
people can reasonably expect that changes will happen at an 
appropriate pace. 
Part I describes the current uses and justifications for zoning 
and reveals the profound disagreements at the heart of land use 
regulations today. Part II explores how slow, incremental change 
minimizes zoning’s interference with expectations. Part III identifies 
specific land use tools and doctrines that can help to minimize 
disruption by controlling the pace of community change. 
I. THE WICKED PROBLEM OF ZONING 
A. Historical Uses and Justifications of Zoning 
Zoning in the United States began in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century as a seemingly technocratic exercise in urban and 
suburban design.19 It was an era marked by increasing confidence in 
scientific and social scientific pursuits of rational order in the world.20 
Early planners, motivated in part by ecology and its embrace of “end 
state” planning, promoted a vision of a well-ordered city.21 They 
championed the view that ecological change was progressing to a 
“climax state” of perfect equilibrium.22 They thought the same was true 
of urban design and that cities would evolve to some climax state where 
everything was in its optimal place.23 Zoning was intended to 
implement that goal.24 
Zoning, as developed and promulgated by the Commerce 
Department in the 1920s, provided a blueprint for local governments to 
divide their municipalities into different zones that prescribed 
maximum uses and densities.25 The Standard Zoning Enabling Act 
 
 19. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 15 (2003) (describing Herbert Hoover’s 
support of and collaborations with planning professionals). 
 20. See Claeys, supra note 13, at 750 (discussing the influence of Progressive ideology  
on zoning). 
 21. Serkin & Macey, supra note 13, at 307–08; see also John Mixon & Kathleen McGlynn, A 
New Zoning and Planning Metaphor: Chaos and Complexity Theory, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1221, 1247 
(2006) (“Land use planning that postulates a terminal state of affairs—a defined land use future—
may be as likely, or even more likely, to produce adverse consequences as to produce an  
ideal environment.”). 
 22. Serkin & Macey, supra note 13, at 307–08. 
 23. Id. at 308. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2012). 
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(SZEA) provides zoning’s fundamental DNA. It created “use districts” 
consisting of broad categories—residential, commercial, and 
industrial—and then subcategories specifying different intensities of 
uses—single-family, duplex, multifamily, and so forth.26 In addition, it 
defined “bulk” limits, like maximum height limits, lot coverage, and 
setbacks from property lines, all of which combine to define buildable 
envelopes.27 The goal was a neatly organized city, segregated by use, 
with people living in one area, working in another, and shopping in still 
another. Moreover, the system was designed to privilege uses in an 
explicit hierarchy, with single-family residential zones at the top and 
industrial uses at the very bottom.28 
Zoning’s early defenders focused on zoning as a kind of ex ante 
nuisance prevention.29 The goal, very explicitly, was to use planning 
expertise to prevent conflicting uses of land before they arose.30 The 
1920s were a time of industrialization and urbanization, and the 
traditional judicial remedy of nuisance law seemed ill suited to the 
intensity of the new land use conflicts. By preventing those conflicts 
ahead of time and assigning uses to the places where they were best 
suited, zoning aimed at efficiency.31 
Consistent with the evolution of wicked problems in other fields, 
this faith in technocratic efficiency seems entirely anachronistic today. 
The traditional vision of zoning has as much in common with modern 
land use controls as It’s a Wonderful Life has in common with modern 
banking.32 Of course, zoning still plays an important role in keeping 
noxious uses—gas stations, factories, adult businesses—out of bucolic 
residential settings. But local governments increasingly favor walkable 
mixed-use neighborhoods that combine residential and commercial 
uses.33 Complex overlays, whether for historic preservation or urban 
 
 26. Id. at 265; see also Claeys, supra note 13, at 739–40 (“Euclidean zoning institutes a 
centralized, command-and-control style of land-use regulation. It operates on the principle, ‘a place 
for everything, and everything in its place.’ ”). 
 27. See, e.g., SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
AMERICAN LAND-USE REGULATION 32 (2014) (describing original zoning limits). 
 28. See Gerald A. Fischer, The Comprehensive Plan Is an Indispensable Compass for 
Navigating Mixed-Use Zoning Decisions Through the Precepts of the Due Process, Takings, and 
Equal Protection Clauses, 40 URB. LAW. 831, 835–36 (2008) (describing a cumulative “pyramid” 
system of zoning with single-family classification the highest use). 
 29. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (describing zoning 
as excluding structures and practices likely to cause nuisances). 
 30. Id. at 394–95 (detailing the benefits of zoning considered by commissions). 
 31. See, e.g., Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1724 (2015) 
(“[Z]oning laws restrict development before it results in unwanted burdens on neighbors, while 
nuisance suits impose liability after the damage has begun.”). 
 32. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946). 
 33. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32–
33 (2004) (“The new urbanists champion dense, ‘mixed use’ neighborhoods . . . .”); Brian W. Ohm 
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design specification, impose different sets of land use goals on top of 
traditional zoning.34 And local governments today deploy zoning as a 
mechanism for fiscal purposes, incorporating exactions and impact fees 
that force developers to pay for infrastructure improvements as a 
condition for land use approvals.35 
In classic wicked-problem fashion, even the goals of zoning are 
increasingly contested, and conflicts between various stakeholders have 
come to dominate current debates about zoning: between insiders and 
outsiders and between environmentalists and proponents of historic 
preservation, among many others.36 Simply unpacking these disparate 
interests and conflicts reveals the complexity—the wickedness—of the 
zoning problem.37 
Zoning began with a focus on idealized end-state goals: 
implementing technocratic planning and preventing land use conflicts 
before they arise.38 Those objectives were complementary and existed 
as a kind of aspirational point that everyone could agree was zoning’s 
target. As faith in technocratic solutions began to wane, zoning’s 
objectives increased from one- to two-dimensional but still could be 
spread relatively neatly along a single line from prodevelopment to 
antidevelopment. Harvey Molotch argued in 1976 that many local 
governments—and their zoning functions—were controlled by a 
“growth machine,” which included the developers, architects, real 
estate brokers, lawyers, and anyone else with a direct economic stake 
 
& Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on Local Ordinances: The Twilight of 
Zoning?, 25 URB. LAW. 783, 785 (2003) (asserting that new urbanists identified “the failure of 
Euclidean zoning to allow for mixed-uses”). 
 34. See generally Dorothy Ariail, Property Topics and Concepts, AM. PLAN. ASS’N, 
https://www.planning.org/divisions/planningandlaw/propertytopics.htm#Overlay (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/25TC-XZ68]. 
 35. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI L. BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, 
LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 647, 670 (4th ed. 2013) (“[I]n most jurisdictions, 
public land use regulation has evolved into a system of fiscal protection and fund-raising.”). 
 36. See infra Part I.B (detailing conflicts among modern approaches to zoning). 
 37. In their seminal piece, Rittel and Webber focus on urban policy as a wicked problem. 
Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 158. That seems like a broader frame than zoning, but, in fact, 
the most intractable disputes in urban policy map perfectly on to land use and zoning disputes. 
Focusing specifically on zoning reveals one of the central features of wicked problems, that the 
definition of the problem is in constant and recursive conversation with solutions, both of which 
are contested. As Rittel and Webber put it, “The information needed to understand [a wicked] 
problem depends on one’s idea for solving it.” Id. at 161. Here, to frame problems of urban policy 
as zoning problems is already to narrow it and to suggest a large but limited range of solutions 
(land use reform), at the expense of others (social safety net, tax policy, antitrust reform, etc.). But 
zoning is wicked enough and reveals the same trajectory and complexity as a classic  
wicked problem. 
 38. See Galle, supra note 31, at 1724 (explaining that zoning restricts land use to  
prevent nuisances). 
        
1886 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1879 
in growth and development.39 This translated into a relatively 
straightforward opposition to regulatory barriers to development. 
On the other end of the spectrum were antidevelopment local 
governments. William Fischel drew a sharp distinction between 
municipalities dominated by the Molotch Growth Machine and those 
dominated by what he called “homevoters”—that is, homeowners who 
vote.40 Quintessentially, these were exclusionary suburbs that became 
the destination of white flight from the urban core.41 Homevoters crave 
stability, if not stasis, both because of the mini cartel the status quo 
creates for existing housing stock (increasing property values) and also 
because of a more generalized and sometimes pernicious resistance to 
changes to community character.42 Zoning is the primary regulatory 
mechanism for resisting growth and change. 
B. Contemporary Uses of Zoning 
Zoning is still sometimes viewed as a zero-sum battleground 
between progrowth and antigrowth factions.43 But the objectives of 
zoning have become much more diverse than this simple two-
dimensional spectrum. Moreover, the “planning” model of zoning has 
increasingly been replaced by a “dealing” model, where zoning is the 
regulatory context for increasingly sophisticated negotiations between 
developers and local officials.44 In a dealing model, the zoning of any 
particular parcel should be seen as a kind of opening offer that is subject 
to change if the developer can offer enough inducement.45 The resulting 
 
 39. Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 
AM. J. SOCIO. 309, 309–10 (1976). 
 40. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 80–81 (2001). 
 41. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 635 (2002) (reviewing FISCHEL, 
supra note 40, at 80–81) (describing exclusionary practices in “homevoter” jurisdictions). 
 42. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 80–82 (showing how homevoters were able to combat 
rent control). 
 43. See, e.g., Daniel Hertz, Homevoters v. the Growth Machine, CITYCOMMENTARY (June 11, 
2018), https://cityobservatory.org/homevoters-v-growth-machine/ [https://perma.cc/C6AN-648W] 
(describing competing pro-growth and anti-growth pressures).  
 44. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 890–91 (1983); see also Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation 
and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 87, 105–09 (2017) (describing how “[t]he 
movement away from long-term comprehensive planning and Euclidean zoning” effected a rise in 
“schemes to facilitate land use planning and bargaining”); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and 
Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 347–49 (2002) (“[C]urrent practices demonstrate that land use decision-
making has shifted significantly from the planned toward the particularized . . . .”). 
 45. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 
92 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (2019) (“Under the dealing model, land use regulations should be 
seen as a kind of opening offer.”). 
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landscape is much more complex. These are not zero-sum tradeoffs but 
instead orthogonal policy concerns.  
To bring some order to the chaos, it is possible to discern several 
overarching categories of municipal motivations for zoning: planning, 
municipal finance, market interventions, preservation, and exclusion.46 
But subcategories tell the real story of disparate policy goals. Not every 
community pursues each of the goals below, nor are they (for the most 
part) mutually exclusive. Moreover, municipalities sometimes pursue 
different dichotomous goals in different neighborhoods. This list is not 
exhaustive, but it is meant to capture the most common municipal 
objectives. They will be immediately familiar to most people and will 
reveal the wickedness of the zoning problem. 
Planning 
1. Separating incompatible uses. Zoning retains at least vestiges 
of its origins in ex ante nuisance prevention. According to a traditional 
planning model, zoning promotes efficiency by preventing conflicts 
before they arise and avoiding the deadweight costs of litigation.47 
2. Rational planning. Urban planners—whose plans usually 
serve as the basis for zoning—are faced with much broader 
considerations than simply preventing land use conflicts among 
neighbors. The search for rational development includes such 
considerations as infrastructure planning and the appropriateness of 
different places for different uses.48 Zoning, then, reflects the policy 
choices of planners and local officials seeking to promote certain kinds 
of development or businesses in certain places in order to promote a 
rational city. For example, transit-oriented development, or increased 
density on arterial roads, is consistent with this objective.49 
3. Satisfying consumer preferences. Rational development may 
not be appealing development to housing consumers. For example, cul-
de-sacs make for terrible urban design. They impede traffic, make police 
 
 46. In previous work, I have identified the most common goals as minimizing harm from 
neighbors, promoting new design forms, encouraging growth, discouraging growth, fiscal zoning, 
zoning as bargaining, zoning to increase property values, affordability, historic preservation, 
community preservation, aesthetic regulation, environmental protection of various sorts, economic 
intervention, and exclusion and segregation. See id., at 1075. 
 47. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (discussing zoning’s 
early rationale as a form of ex ante nuisance prevention). 
 48. See, e.g., ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN CITY: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 3–4 (2d 
ed. 2002) (discussing public investment in infrastructure as well as size and character regulations 
as typical of urban planning). 
 49. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get 
There from Here?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1529, 1539 (2002) (describing a more sustainable 
approach to transportation that focuses on accessibility and livability as part of a “smart growth” 
development policy). 
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and fire protection more difficult, and can interfere with creating 
walkable places.50 Planners are usually opposed to cul-de-sacs,51 but 
housing consumers often love them.52 Property values in cul-de-sacs are 
systemically higher precisely because of the lack of cut-through traffic 
and the sense of neighborhood control over streets.53 The divergence 
between planning goals and housing consumer goals is a theme in the 
land use and planning literature.54 The point here is that zoning aspires 
sometimes to the goals of planning and sometimes to the goals of 
consumers, and the two are not necessarily the same. 
Municipal Finance 
4. Tax revenue. Zoning can also be implemented to try to enhance 
local tax revenue, which means attracting uses that produce the 
greatest net fiscal benefits to a local government.55 Translating this into 
policy depends on local context. In places where property taxes are 
capped, for example, local officials may try to attract more commercial 
uses that generate sales tax. Most local governments depend primarily 
on property taxes, however, and maximizing tax revenue often means 
trying to restrict or exclude inexpensive multifamily housing.56 In 
purely fiscal terms, lower-income households with children who attend 
local public schools are often net negatives for local governments; 
whereas, wealthy empty nesters in expensive houses are net positives.57 
 
 50. See, e.g., Paul Cozens & David Hillier, The Shape of Things to Come: New Urbanism, the 
Grid and the Cul-De-Sac, 13 INT’L PLAN. STUD. 51, 51 (2008) (arguing that gird layouts enhance 
walkability more than cul-de-sac layouts); Paul K. Asabere, The Value of Neighborhood Street with 
Reference to the Cul-De-Sac, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 185, 186 (1990) (indicating that cul-de-
sacs reduce pedestrian traffic and make maneuvering for fire department vehicles more difficult). 
 51. See, e.g., Paul Cozens & David Hillier, supra note 50, at 51. 
 52. See Paul K. Asabere, supra note 50, at 191 (finding positive property values associated 
with cul-de-sac street layout). 
 53. Id. at 186, 191. 
 54. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1325 
(1955) (observing that planning footpaths in advance removes the opportunity to see where 
residents will walk most often); John Rahenkamp, Land Use Management: An Alternative to 
Controls, in FUTURE LAND USE: ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 191, 191–92 
(Robert W. Burchell & David Listokin eds., 1975) (arguing that planners are historically bad at 
predicting consumer behavior). 
 55. See Eric A. Hanushek & Kuzey Yilmaz, Land-Use Controls, Fiscal Zoning, and the Local 
Provision of Education, 43 PUB. FIN. REV. 559, 563–67 (2015) (discussing how localities often make 
zoning choices in order to increase their tax base to fund public services such as education). 
 56. See Serkin, supra note 45, at 1064–65 (explaining that local governments seek to 
minimize low-income households due to the burden on municipal services). 
 57. See Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: 
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1670 (2013) (describing 
how wealthier property owners’ higher property taxes implicitly subsidize public services for low-
income families). 
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The mix of land uses in a municipality will have a significant impact on 
its tax base, its expenditures, and therefore its bottom line. 
5. Fees and exactions. In addition to tax revenue, land use 
regulation can have a more direct impact on municipal finances by 
producing fees and exactions.58 Exactions are conditions that a local 
government imposes before granting permission to develop property, 
and they vary widely in form.59 For example, a local government may 
require certain infrastructure improvements or abatement of certain 
impacts before allowing development to proceed. These improvements 
can include street or stormwater upgrades, investments in transit, or 
even development of new schools, in addition to direct cash payments.60 
The Constitution limits exactions by requiring them to be related to, 
and proportional to, the burden being imposed by the new 
development.61 In other words, a local government cannot extort money 
from developers, but it can force them to internalize the marginal cost 
of the development on municipal services and infrastructure. In so 
doing, a local government can shift the costs of growth from insiders—
existing property owners who would pay through increases in property 
taxes—to newcomers and outsiders, who pay in the form of higher 
housing costs.62 
Market Interventions 
6. Increasing property values. One of the self-interested reasons 
that in-place property owners may want to restrict growth is to increase 
local property values.63 By definition, zoning operates as a restriction 
on supply, which tends to increase housing costs, all else being equal.64 
The effect of zoning on property values is deeply dependent on context. 
Sometimes attracting development is necessary to spur investment or 
 
 58. Serkin, supra note 45, at 1065–66.  
 59. See Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 654–
58 (2019) (describing the use of exactions). 
 60. See id. at 658 (“Other common legislated exactions in other jurisdictions include fees for 
schools, wastewater, parks, and fire departments, to name just a few.”). 
 61. See id. at 703–04 (describing constitutional limits on exactions). 
 62. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 31–32) (on file with author) (describing the use 
of zoning to shift costs of growth). 
 63. See FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 6 (explaining how concern for home values leads home 
owners to advocate for and against zoning changes); see also Christopher Serkin, Big Differences 
for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1648 
(2006) (stating that because a home is often a person’s most significant financial asset, 
homeowners are incentivized to police local government land use decisions). 
 64. See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s Steep Price, 25 REG. 24, 26 (2002) 
(finding evidence that zoning is responsible for high housing costs in certain markets); see also Rolf 
Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 125, 129, 
138 (2000) (describing how zoning laws can increase housing costs and exclude minority groups). 
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reinvestment in a place.65 But there is no question that zoning plays an 
important role in enhancing local property values, and indeed for some, 
that quality is its central animating purpose.66 
7. Promoting affordability. For others, the opposite goal is more 
important: zoning to promote affordability.67 Affordability can be 
addressed directly within a zoning ordinance. For example, 
inclusionary zoning can require or incentivize the production of 
affordable housing units as part of the development of market-rate 
units.68 But zoning can also encourage affordability simply by loosening 
development restrictions and unlocking additional supply.69 
8. Economic Protectionism. Local governments can also use 
zoning to favor (or disfavor) particular businesses or economic interests. 
Efforts to exclude large box stores—the Wal-Mart Wars70— are 
emblematic of efforts to protect downtown businesses. Other cases are 
legion, from excluding new office buildings to protect owners of existing 
vacant office space, to prohibitions of all kinds of uses coupled with 
grandfathering protection for those that already exist.71 
Preservation 
9. Historic preservation. Historic preservation has become an 
abiding concern of land use regulations, if not zoning per se.72 Historic 
 
 65. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 513–14 (1991) (describing local 
efforts to attract new development). 
 66. See, e.g., John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 93 
(2014) (describing relationship between supply restrictions and price). 
 67. See, e.g., KEITH WARDRIP, LAURA WILLIAMS & SUZANNE HAGUE, CTR. FOR HOUS. POL’Y, 
THE ROLE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN CREATING JOBS AND STIMULATING LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 10–13 (2011), https://providencehousing.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Housing-and-Economic-Development-Report-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
SN7E-V83E] (indicating that localities may consider the promotion of affordable housing when 
making zoning decisions).  
 68. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause, 
42 VT. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017) (stating that many liberal scholars and policymakers advocate for 
zoning that increases population density and prevents gentrification). 
 69. Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply 
and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25, 29 (2018). 
 70. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 120–21 (providing a legal history of the Wal-Mart 
Wars); see also DAVID PORTER & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, MEGAMALL ON THE HUDSON: PLANNING, 
WAL-MART, AND GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE (2003) (examining one community’s efforts to prevent 
construction of a Wal-Mart); William E. Roper & Elizabeth Humstone, Wal-Mart in Vermont—The 
Case Against Sprawl, 22 VT. L. REV. 755, 758 (1998) (describing efforts to prevent the building of 
a Wal-Mart in the Town of St. Albans, Vermont). 
 71. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(excluding new office building to protect existing office buildings from competition); Christopher 
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1223–24 
(2009) (describing the dynamics surrounding legal protections for existing uses). 
 72. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 45, at 1068–69 (describing historic preservation). 
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preservation is often a separate regulatory regime, although historic 
overlays and other designations are sometimes built into zoning 
ordinances.73 Whatever the mechanism, local governments often seek 
to protect historic buildings and neighborhoods and so prevent their 
destruction or redevelopment.74 
11. Community preservation. Historic preservation is often a 
proxy for community preservation. That is, some local governments 
preserve buildings or neighborhoods regardless of their actual historical 
value because what they genuinely care about is resisting change. In 
some states, local governments have a mechanism to accomplish this 
directly through the designation of community preservation districts.75 
More commonly, local governments create a historic overlay on a 
neighborhood that they are trying to protect from redevelopment—not 
so much for the history of the place but instead to make it more difficult 
to subdivide and redevelop.76 
13. Environmental preservation. Local governments also use 
zoning and land use regulations to preserve open space and to protect 
the environment. This can take two different, and often conflicting, 
forms. More conventionally, zoning ordinances would designate swaths 
of property for low-density uses in order to preserve vegetation, fields, 
or other vulnerable habitats.77 In previous work, I dubbed this 
“aesthetic environmentalism,” which seeks primarily to preserve the 
feel of a place as rural instead of urban or suburban.78 Increasingly, 
however, people have realized that strict density limits meant to 
preserve open space often result in sprawl. Preserving one place as 
relatively rural means pushing development elsewhere, often further 
from jobs and into places where commutes increase.79 The end result is 
an increase in vehicle miles traveled and carbon emissions, which is 
decidedly not environmentally friendly. As a result, other places seek to 
promote dense development near transit in order to pursue 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., J. Dennis Doyle, Historic Preservation Zoning in Maryland, 5 MD. L.F. 100, 101–
05 (1976) (explaining the mechanics of historic zoning). 
 75. See William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt and 
Suspenders of Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339, 347–49 (2013) (providing background 
information regarding community preservation districts). 
 76. See Serkin, supra note 45, at 1069 (“[H]istoric preservation is often a kind of rough proxy 
for the real concern of preventing displacement of the existing community.”). 
 77. See id. at 1071–72 (indicating that zoning ordinances are traditionally used to protect 
environmental resources such as wetlands). 
 78. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 16) (on file with author). 
 79. See Serkin, supra note 45, at 1071 (describing the sprawl associated with single-family 
residential suburbs and the increased distance from city centers). 
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environmental goals.80 Still others use zoning to try to exclude carbon-
intensive uses, like energy extraction.81 The form therefore varies 
tremendously across local governments, but environmental concerns 
nevertheless animate zoning in many places. 
Exclusion 
14. Race. Zoning has been bound up with pernicious racist 
exclusion since its very origin.82 The first attempts at zoning in this 
country were not to create the use-based zones of the SZEA but were 
instead to create racial zoning that sought to segregate explicitly by 
race.83 The Supreme Court invalidated that practice very quickly, so 
explicit race-based zoning has been squarely unconstitutional for over 
a century.84 Nevertheless, zoning in some places remains motivated by 
racial hostility.85 Because of the close connection between race and 
wealth, some communities seek to exclude affordable, low-income 
housing in order to try to exclude minorities.86 Others engage in what 
is called “expulsive zoning,” which sites noxious industrial uses in 
majority-minority neighborhoods.87 And still others use blight 
designations, or other redevelopment strategies, to try to force out in-
place minority communities.88 The mechanisms for exclusion and 
expulsion are myriad. Zoning, unfortunately, can be deployed to 
promote racial segregation and exclusion. 
 
 80. Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local 
Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and Preserve Resources 
for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 153 (2009). 
 81. See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1203 (N.Y. 2014) (holding that local 
governments can zone to exclude oil and gas production within municipal boundaries). 
 82. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 7) (on file with author); see also Christopher 
Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23, 24 (June Manning Thomas & Masha Ritzdorf eds., 
1997) (explaining zoning’s origins as a mechanism for excluding “undesirables”). 
 83. See Gretchen Boger, The Meaning of Neighborhood in the Modern City: Baltimore’s 
Residential Segregation Ordinances, 1910–1913, 35 J. URB. HIST. 236, 237 (2009) (describing 
Baltimore, Maryland’s residential segregation ordinances as “the first attempt in the United 
States to legally separate the living space of blacks and whites”); Garrett Power, Apartheid 
Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 289 
(1983) (detailing how the mayor of Baltimore enacted an ordinance in 1911 legalizing  
housing segregation). 
 84. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 69, 82 (1917) (invalidating Louisville, Kentucky’s 
segregated housing ordinance on Fourteenth Amendment grounds). 
 85. Cf. John Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (discussing pernicious and benign uses of zoning). 
 86. Id. (manuscript at 3–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3549364 
[https://perma.cc/JUE2-8X8U]. 
 87. Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning 
in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1993). 
 88. E.g., Pritchett, supra note 19, at 47. 
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15. Income. Sometimes exclusion is not race based but is instead 
income based. Local governments may seek to exclude low-income or 
affordable housing in order to try to exclude the poor.89 This exclusion 
is consistent with the objective of maximizing property tax revenue, as 
articulated above, but can be based on more invidious distaste. That is, 
some local governments may exclude affordable multifamily housing in 
order to try to maximize net property taxes, while others may do so 
because they simply do not want poor people living nearby.90 This can 
be orthogonal to purely economic motives, based instead on prejudices 
around crime, social capital, and lifestyle.  
16. Marginalized groups. Exclusion, of course, can be directed at 
other groups as well. Zoning often seeks to exclude group homes for the 
mentally ill, youth rehabilitation facilities, or methadone or other drug 
recovery clinics.91 These kinds of uses can have an adverse impact on 
local property values if for no other reason than the stigma associated 
with them.92 Sometimes, of course, they are associated with increased 
criminal activity, or at least the presence of more transient people in 
the community, and so are a frequent target of exclusion.93 
17. Morality. Zoning is also often directed at other uses for 
reasons of moral disapprobation. Adult uses, like strip clubs and adult 
bookstores, are often targets of zoning.94 While the First Amendment 
quintessentially prohibits regulation based on the substantive content 
of expressive activity, the Supreme Court has upheld land use 
regulations directed at the secondary effects of adult uses, like crime 
prevention.95 But such morality-infused zoning can also target religious 
minorities, like efforts to ban a mosque in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.96 
 
 89. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 
1975) (holding that local governments could not exclude low income housing from the community). 
 90. Id. at 723. 
 91. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (discussing exclusion 
of a group home); RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726–27 (W.D. Pa. 
2010) (discussing exclusion of a methadone clinic). 
 92. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 93. RHJ Med. Ctr., 754 F. Supp. 2d at 739. 
 94. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429–30 (2002) 
(upholding city ordinance prohibiting operation of multiple adult businesses in a single building). 
 95. See id. For critiques, see Daniel Linz, Kenneth C. Land, Jay R. Williams, Bryant Paul & 
Michael E. Ezell, An Examination of the Assumption that Adult Businesses Are Associated with 
Crime in Surrounding Areas: A Secondary Effects Study in Charlotte, North Carolina, 38 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 69 (2004); and Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz & Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation 
of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of 
Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 355 (2001). 
 96. See United States v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076, at *2 (M.D. 
Tenn. July 18, 2012) (issuing a temporary restraining order to require that the county process a 
mosque’s certificate of occupancy). 
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C. Contested Land Use 
The proliferation of land use goals means that zoning fights have 
become particularly difficult to resolve. Proponents and opponents of 
development often find themselves talking past each other or having 
ulterior motives ascribed to them. Preservationists are branded racists; 
developers are labeled community busters.97 Fights splinter and 
fragment along many dimensions.98 Consider the complex relationship 
between the interrelated issues of affordability, parochialism, 
preservation, and property values. 
There is an emerging elite consensus that zoning is too 
restrictive in many of America’s thriving cities.99 By limiting the supply 
of new development, zoning keeps prices high and therefore out of reach 
for many people looking for affordable places to live.100 The solution, 
according to many policymakers and scholars, is to relax zoning 
restrictions and allow greater density.101 This will address issues of 
equity by allowing more people to access desirable communities. 
However, increasing density can change the character of a community 
and displace expectations of in-place residents who may have chosen 
where to live because of a specific set of characteristics.102 It may reduce 
local governments’ ability to control the fiscal impacts of growth. And it 
will also tend to put downward pressure on property values (or at least 
keep them from increasing quite so quickly).103 Whether this last one is 
 
 97. See, e.g., Andrew Keatts, Single-Family Zoning’s Century of Supremacy in San Diego, 
VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/land-use/single-fa 
mily-zonings-century-of-supremacy-in-san-diego/ [https://perma.cc/J4PQ-BCBH] (“ ‘Exclusionary 
zoning, like single-family zoning, is used as a planning tool by local cities around the nation to 
segregate Black, Brown and poor residents from wealthier and whiter neighborhoods’ . . . .”); 
Dennis McGurk, Letter How to Destroy a City, GLOUCESTER DAILY TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.gloucestertimes.com/opinion/letters_to_the_editor/letter-how-to-destroy-a-city/article 
_7723f24e-cb75-51c2-b6e7-eb88fd184499.html [https://perma.cc/MW3P-URGT] (complaining 
about the destructive impact of unchecked development). 
 98. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 45, at 1080–85 (describing the complex politics of a 
development fight in Nashville’s Music Row). 
 99. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks & Christopher Serkin, Regulation and the 
Geography of Inequality, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming). 
 100. See Been et al., supra note 69, at 26 (“[T]he preponderance of evidence suggests that 
easing barriers to new construction will moderate price increases and therefore make housing 
more affordable to low- and moderate-income families.”). 
 101. See Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/9Y7R-
4YR9] (arguing that land use controls inflate housing prices); Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson 
& Eric Biber, Developing Policy from the Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to 
Inform California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 1, 72–74 (2019) (suggesting 
that state policymakers change local land-use approval regulations in order to improve  
housing production). 
 102. See Glaeser, supra note 101 (“Restricting growth is often locally popular.”). 
 103. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
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a feature or a bug depends on one’s perspective as an aspiring resident 
versus an in-place property owner.  
There are also externalities to consider. While choosing whether 
to upzone a neighborhood may seem like a quintessentially local 
decision, the effects of similar decisions within a region can be profound. 
For one, restrictions on supply in some “superstar” cities can drive up 
prices and thereby reduce the incentive of workers to move to those 
places with booming economies.104 Indeed, interregional mobility has 
actually declined, even as geographic inequality has increased, because 
there is less motivation to move to a place with higher wages if housing 
costs will consume most or all of that advantage.105 The resulting 
mismatch between labor supply and demand has economic 
consequences for the economy as a whole. Some scholars have 
calculated a reduction in national GDP of trillions of dollars because of 
local zoning decisions restricting housing supply in the nation’s 
superstar cities.106 
Additionally, zoning often has discriminatory effects and 
exacerbates patterns of housing segregation.107 Some of the most bitter 
land use fights involve the siting of affordable housing. Affluent 
communities in particular will go to sometimes extreme lengths to 
prevent the development of affordable housing.108 Simultaneously, 
more intensive development, as well as noxious uses, are often 
concentrated in minority communities that have fewer resources and 
 
 104. Richard Florida, Why America’s Richest Cities Keep Getting Richer, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/richard-florida-winner-take-all-new 
-urban-crisis/522630/ [https://perma.cc/399Q-AKXC]; see also Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why 
Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 89–90 (2017) 
(finding that housing price increase affect migration patterns). 
 105. See Sitaraman et al., supra note 99; see also Florida, supra note 104 (explaining that real-
estate prices in superstar cities are a key factor in economic inequality). 
 106. See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation, 
11 AM. ECON. J. 1, 26 n.28 (2019) (indicating that a change in housing supply policy could lead to 
a GDP increase of 8.9 percent); see also Space and the City: Poor Land Use in the World’s Greatest 
Cities Carries a Huge Cost, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders 
/2015/04/04/space-and-the-city [https://perma.cc/H8VQ-CUVQ] (“Lifting all the barriers to urban 
growth in America could raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1 
trillion-2 trillion.”). 
 107. Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces 
Segregation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 443 (2020) (discussing the role of zoning in promoting 
racial segregation); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY  
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (describing role of zoning in  
housing segregation). 
 108. See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, For Westchester, 11th Time Is Charm in Fight over Fair 
Housing, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/westchester-
fair-housing-hud-trump.html [https://perma.cc/YUG9-FAW8] (describing Westchester County’s 
opposition to affordable housing). 
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less ability to resist.109 This combination puts pressure on patterns of 
segregation. While nationwide trends show that racial segregation has 
decreased somewhat over the last few decades, many places remain 
largely segregated.110 
Battlegrounds in these fights over density are not limited to 
minimum lot sizes and other explicit density restrictions. For example, 
parking requirements for new development can regulate density.111 
Likewise, historic preservation can be a significant barrier to 
development.112 Disputes over historic preservation pit the past, 
present, and future against each other in complex configurations of 
interests. Often, existing residents invoke historic preservation to 
protect the past for future generations but are actually interested in 
preserving the existing character of the community for themselves. 
Other battlegrounds are larger with more sweeping effects. 
Minneapolis and the entire state of Oregon have all but banned single-
family residential neighborhoods, allowing multifamily development as 
of right.113 That is a sea change in conventional zoning, which privileged 
single-family housing above all else.  
This is just a taste of the complexity of zoning disputes. And 
these disputes are usually focused on a single development controversy. 
When a local government contemplates rezoning land for some large 
new project, proponents and opponents come out of the woodwork 
invoking all of these concerns and more. So what is a local government 
 
 109. See, e.g., Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the 
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1012–13 (1993) (indicating 
that the Los Angeles County zip code with the largest amount of chemical discharge is 59 percent 
African-American); Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 
1041 (2003) (“[A]cademics, government agencies, and others undertook systematic studies that 
suggested that LULU distributions were correlated with race and income.”). 
 110. William H. Frey, Black-White Segregation Edges Downward Since 2000, Census Shows, 
BROOKINGS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ the-avenue/2018/12/17/black-white-
segregation-edges-downward-since-2000-census-shows/ [https://perma.cc/TDU4-6KYZ]. 
 111. See, e.g., Joshua Sabatini, Minimum Parking Requirements on Their Way Out in SF, S.F. 
EXAMINER (Dec. 4, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/minimum-parking-requirements-
way-sf/ [https://perma.cc/3KWB-2WRV] (describing how eliminating parking requirements can 
make cities more walkable). 
 112. See David E. Clark & William E. Herrin, Historical Preservation Districts and Home Sale 
Prices: Evidence from the Sacramento Housing Market, 27 REV. REG’L STUD. 29, 30 (1997) 
(explaining the regulatory hurdles developers must undergo in historic preservation districts); see 
also DANIEL KAY HERTZ, THE BATTLE OF LINCOLN PARK: URBAN RENEWAL AND GENTRIFICATION IN 
CHICAGO 59 (2018) (describing the role of historic preservation in the gentrification of  
Lincoln Park). 
 113. Will Parker, Does Oregon Have the Answers to High Housing Costs?, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-oregon-have-the-answer-to-high-housing-costs-11571823001, 
(last updated Oct. 23, 2019, 3:42 PM), [https://perma.cc/ND2B-SE7Q]; Henry Grabar, Minneapolis 
Confronts Its History of Housing Segregation, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://slate.com/ 
business/2018/12/minneapolis-single-family-zoning-housing-racism.html [https://perma.cc/F6SH-
HHCG]. 
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to do? How can local officials manage these conflicting interests and 
demands? When local governments are confronted with the wicked 
problem of zoning, there is rarely an easy solution. 
II. ZONING AND INCREMENTAL CHANGE 
One of the hallmarks of wicked problems, as traditionally 
formulated, is that they cannot be solved incrementally (if they can be 
solved at all).114 Experimentation is impossible (or difficult) because 
each small change alters the nature of the problem.115 As Rittel and 
Webber explained, “Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot 
operation’; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, 
every attempt counts significantly.”116 Perhaps as a result, most people 
working on wicked problems tend to focus on moonshots, or other broad 
global solutions.117 
This is certainly true in zoning and land use regulation. Scholars 
have also proposed a variety of innovations, many of which would 
require wholesale change. Professors Rick Hills and David Schleicher, 
for example, have proposed adopting a “zoning budget” that would 
require downzoning be accompanied by upzoning in other places.118 
Professors Elmendorf and Schanske have proposed “auctioning 
upzonings” so that local governments can benefit from allowing 
increased development.119 Lee Fennell would create an options market 
allowing people to hedge against community change,120 and Richard 
Epstein would eliminate most land use regulations altogether.121 Such 
 
 114. See, e.g., Daviter, supra note 11, at 572 (“This type of policy problem is frequently seen to 
defy problem-solving by definition.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Ian Sanderson, Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism, 
Evidence and Learning, 57 POL. STUD. 699, 705–06 (2009) (“[E]lements of systems are mutually 
dependent, interactions between them are non-linear and therefore the response of the system to 
change in one element may be highly disproportionate.”). 
 116. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 163. 
 117. See Daviter, supra note 11, at 574 (“In stark contrast to the widely shared notion that 
solving wicked problems is not a viable option, a sizable part of the more recent debate appears to 
promote strategies that are designed to accomplish exactly that.”). 
 118. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. 
RSRV. L. REV. 81, 120 (2011). 
 119. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Auctioning the Upzone, 69 CASE W. RSRV. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 120. Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 
165–71 (2010). 
 121. See Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What’s Wrong with Euclid, 5 
N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 277, 291 (1996) (“Can zoning provide an improvement to the common-law system 
in proportion to its increase in costs and delay? I suspect that the answer to this question is 
negative . . . .”). 
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large-scale solutions have gained little traction, but more modest 
changes have their own challenges.  
There is a literature on incremental solutions to wicked or 
complex problems.122 Some embrace step-by-step solutions, either out of 
necessity because of technological limitations or to avoid committing to 
a path that turns out to be a mistake.123 Embracing incremental 
solutions is therefore usually presented as a kind of compromise: a 
second-best approach when a comprehensive solution is out of reach. 
The Supreme Court framed the problem precisely this way in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, reasoning that agencies cannot “resolve massive 
problems in one fell swoop. They instead whittle away at them over 
time . . . .”124 Others, however, argue that such incremental approaches 
cannot succeed. The very act of whittling can change the nature of the 
problem, making it even more difficult to solve.125 In other words, 
incremental solutions are never ideal; the question is whether they 
make matters worse. 
Zoning is different. Incrementalism in this context is not baby 
steps towards an elusive solution to the problem of land use regulation. 
It is, instead, its own independent virtue. Reframing the purpose of 
zoning to focus on regulating the pace of change means that slow 
incremental changes to community character are a way of balancing 
competing interests.126 
Incremental change in this context does not mean the piecemeal 
trial and error of zoning through the policy laboratory of states and local 
governments. Lessons from San Francisco or New York are not 
necessarily applicable to Ames, Iowa or Nashville, Tennessee, let alone 
to rural towns in Vermont or Kentucky. The lessons of trials in one place 
are not likely to prevent errors in another because contexts are so 
different. And land use decisions are not amenable to trial and error 
 
 122. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
79, 79–81 (1959) (arguing for an incremental approach); MICHAEL T. HAYES, INCREMENTALISM AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1992) (discussing Lindblom’s theory of incremental policy change); see also Moira 
Zellner & Scott D. Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems: What Can We Learn from 
Aligning Complex Systems and Wicked Problems?, 16 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 457, 465 (2015) 
(describing the literature on incremental solutions). 
 123. See generally Daviter, supra note 11, at 571–87 (discussing strategies of coping, taming, 
and solving). 
 124. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 10, at 65 
(describing the process of “whittling away” at wicked problems). 
 125. See, e.g., Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165 (criticizing incrementalism and arguing 
that it “may result in making things worse, because it may become more difficult to deal with the 
higher problems. Marginal improvement does not guarantee overall improvement.”). 
 126. See Serkin, supra note 9. 
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because regulatory changes trigger development decisions that are not 
easily undone. The built environment constrains subsequent change.127 
Incrementalism, instead, refers to a particular local 
government’s use of zoning to ensure that development in a 
neighborhood occurs at an appropriate pace given the local context. 
Regulating the pace of change is a way of balancing the expectations of 
stability with the competing needs of dynamism and change.128 This 
focus on pace of change is usually missing from land use fights. 
Consider a typical fight over some proposed new development 
that will reconfigure the use of some swath of land. In suburbs and 
exurbs, imagine the conversion of agricultural land to a new 
condominium development. In an urban setting, imagine the infill 
redevelopment of an old industrial building into a large mixed-use 
tower. In either case, local residents will often object. They may dislike 
the change in aesthetics. They may worry about the change in 
population or demographics—often, a euphemism for race—or they may 
worry about increased burdens on local infrastructure, like roads and 
schools. And, fundamentally, they often worry about changes in the 
character of the community.  
Time, however, is important. Change that happens quickly is 
more disruptive to expectations than change that happens slowly, even 
if the end results are the same.129 Indeed, there are a number of 
property doctrines that serve to incorporate slow changes but resist 
quick ones. Consider, for example, the arcane common law rules 
governing accretion and avulsion. Where property boundaries are 
defined by water—either a river or the ocean—those boundaries are 
fluid.130 Rivers and shorelines change through the slow process of 
accretion and erosion.131 And where that occurs, the legal property lines 
shift, sometimes expanding and sometimes shrinking the area of 
someone’s land.132 On the shoreline, for example, the boundary between 
public and private land is defined as the mean high-water line, a 
 
 127. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829 (2009) (“In addition 
to its complexity, land has memory. Changes that human beings make to the land have a tendency 
to remain in place until they are affirmatively removed.”). 
 128. See generally Serkin, supra note 9. 
 129. See Serkin, supra note 15. 
 130. Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 
TUL. ENV’T L.J. 305, 306 (2009) (“The law provides that when the water’s edge shifts ‘gradually 
and imperceptibly’ (accretion), the property boundary moves with it.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. Phillip Wm. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of Riparian and 
Littoral Title Problems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENV’T L. 265, 275–76 (1991) (discussing the 
effects of accretion and erosion upon land boundaries). 
 132. See id. (explaining the “universal rule” that the owner of the bank or shore becomes the 
owner of “accreted lands” while also risking the loss of land due to erosion). 
        
1900 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1879 
natural phenomenon that can change over time.133 Accretion will extend 
the private lot out towards the sea, and erosion will do the opposite. 
Occasionally, however, that boundary changes quickly and 
dramatically, like in a hurricane or a flood. Where the process is not 
slow accretion but is instead dramatic “avulsion,” the rules are 
different, and legal property lines will resist the ecological change.134 
The property owner (or the government) can push the river back to its 
preavulsive course or the shoreline back into place. Professor Sax, in 
his leading writing on this subject, found the distinction between 
accretion and avulsion inexplicable.135 Why, he asked, should it matter 
whether the change happens all at once or gradually? The end result is 
the same, and the law should not distinguish between them.136 But it 
does matter because changes that occur gradually are more easily 
incorporated into expectations. 
People are often wrong about what will bother them in the future 
and do not accurately predict how quickly they will adjust to change.137 
Faced with some large new development next door, neighbors often 
react with hostility, imagining that they will wake up every morning 
mortified by the changes to the neighborhood. They imagine some new 
eyesore blocking the horizon and changing the character of the 
community; one day, they live in their bucolic neighborhood surrounded 
by people they know, and the next day they do not. That would, indeed, 
be jarring and dislocating. But they are likely to be wrong.  
One extreme example is the fight over Atlantic Yards in 
Brooklyn, New York, an expansive uncovered rail yard in the heart of 
downtown Brooklyn.138 In order to spur revitalization in the area, New 
York City partnered with a developer, Bruce Ratner, to develop the 
entire area, including the construction of the Barclay’s Center to house 
the Brooklyn (then New Jersey) Nets basketball team, massive new 
residential towers, hundreds of thousands of square feet of commercial 
 
 133. Sax, supra note 130, at 306. 
 134. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep’t. of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709 (2010) 
(“[W]hen a new strip of land has been added to the shore by avulsion, the littoral owner has no 
right to subsequent accretions.”). 
 135. See Sax, supra note 130, at 351 (describing the doctrinal “accretion/avulsion” distinction 
as a problem that leads to disputes). 
 136. Id. (“[The distinction between accretion and avulsion] will doubtless arise repeatedly in 
sea level-rise controversies, and it continues to generate a good deal of wasteful litigation, with 
pointless and expensive lay and expert testimony, and dispute over distinctions that ought to make 
no difference.”). 
 137. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 92 (2006) (indicating that humans often 
incorrectly imagine future events). 
 138. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 165–66 (N.Y. 2009) 
(describing the Atlantic Yards development). 
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office space, and other elements.139 The envisioned changes to the 
neighborhood were dramatic. And it engendered commensurate 
opposition. Legal and political battles broke out, challenging the use of 
eminent domain, the bidding process, and the new vision for the area.140 
A local theater company produced a musical detailing the community 
outrage.141 Local protests spread throughout the city and even the 
country. “Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn” T-shirts popped up 
everywhere, hipster status symbols objecting to the scale of the 
development and the gentrification it was sure to bring. 
Retelling that story is not important here. What is important is 
what happened afterwards. Many of the opponents’ pessimistic 
predictions in fact came to pass. Promises to include affordable and 
inclusionary housing turned ephemeral.142 Gentrification dramatically 
changed the mix of nearby commercial uses.143 Property values 
increased. And yet, ten years later, the development has become just 
part of the city’s background. Neighbors may still get annoyed on 
hockey night, but many nearby residents—including some of the most 
ardent opponents—now no longer notice the changes the development 
brought. Certainly, some communities were displaced, and other harms 
are simply invisible. But the hysteria has largely disappeared, and 
some have even embraced the space.144 Given enough time, neighbors’ 
expectations adapted to the new urban landscape.  
 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Charles V. Bagli, $3 Million Deal Ends a Holdout in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/nyregion/22yards.html [https://perma.cc/NV33-V6SV] 
(describing the history of the opposition to the Atlantic Yards project). 
 141. See Melena Ryzik, In Brooklyn, Dramatizing Real Discord, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/theater/10footprint.html [https://perma.cc/4PZQ-SUZN] 
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 142. See Norman Oder, Brooklyn Lawmakers Seek Pacific Park Affordable Housing Schedule, 
BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (June 4, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/06/04/pacific-park 
-affordable-housing-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/M6RK-PNC3] (describing promised affordable 
housing units in Atlantic Yards); Norman Oder, Ever-Shifting Pacific Park Plan Highlights 
Uncertainty of Big Development Schemes, CITY LIMITS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://citylimits.org/2019/ 
04/03/ever-shifting-pacific-park-plan-highlights-uncertainty-of-big-development-schemes/ 
[https://perma.cc/C6WR-9RPJ] (describing delays and uncertainty surrounding the building of 
affordable housing units in Atlantic Yards). 
 143. See, e.g., Paul Leonard, ‘This Arena Is a Gentrifying Machine’: Atlantic Yards Critics Rally 
at Barclays, PATCH (Sept. 28, 2012, 5:21 PM), https://patch.com/new-york/fortgreene/this-arena-is-
a-gentrifying-machine-atlantic-yards-cr29603c7696 [https://perma.cc/38DG-ET22] (indicating 
that the Atlantic Yards project accelerated gentrification in Brooklyn). 
 144. See, e.g., Andy Newman, How a Once-Loathed Brooklyn Arena Became a Protest 
Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3fwiG5w [https://perma.cc/9K9B-BPW9] 
(describing how the controversial Barclays plaza in Atlantic Yards became a center point of the 
community’s Black Lives Matter protests). 
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This adaptability to change is backed by psychological literature. 
A number of studies of consumer behavior have demonstrated that 
humans do not do a very good job predicting future happiness and 
unhappiness.145 People expect that some new purchase will bring them 
joy, and while it may momentarily,146 such emotions tend to be much 
more fleeting than people expect.147 The same is true of harms.148 
Studies of hedonic adaption suggest that people adjust to new 
realities—including even catastrophic injuries—more quickly than they 
might predict.149 
This does not mean that people’s preferences or objections 
should simply be ignored. Housing advocates can point to examples like 
Atlantic Yards and argue that people will adapt to change, so their 
hostility should be ignored in the planning process. That argument goes 
too far, however, because the harm is real even if impermanent. 
Community transitions impose costs, and regulating the pace of change 
can minimize those costs. 
One of the leading justifications for local control over property 
taxation and spending comes from the pioneering work of Charles 
Tiebout in the 1950s.150 In his famous Tiebout Hypothesis, he explored 
whether and why to expect local governments to provide efficient levels 
of public services in the absence of a price signal.151 That is, one might 
expect that local governments’ ability to impose an involuntary 
property tax might lead to the oversupply of municipal services, with 
local governments providing benefits that people do not, in fact, value. 
Tiebout demonstrated, however, that the ability of consumers to vote 
 
 145. See, e.g., Elizabeth W. Dunn, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, If Money Doesn’t 
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 151. See Christopher Serkin, Capitalization and Exclusionary Zoning, in MEASURING THE 
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with their feet can operate as an essential restraint on government 
taxing and spending.152 He hypothesized that people choose where to 
live based on the specific taxes and services that a location offers.153 In 
his model, people could choose between an infinite number of local 
governments, at which point he predicted that people would sort into 
perfectly homogenous enclaves.154 Subsequent work extended his model 
into heterogenous places, demonstrating that the capitalization of 
property taxes and services into property values can still produce the 
same kind of outcome.155 The result is that this form of foot voting 
serves as a central justification for local control and an important 
mechanism for satisfying people’s preferences.156 
The Tiebout Hypothesis depends, however, on stability in local 
taxes and spending priorities—in short, on stability in the character of 
the local government.157 Changes in the mix can mean that housing 
consumers who selected a place for one set of characteristics may find 
that the place changes over time, sometimes dramatically. Their 
choices, then, are to suffer the disutility of living in a place that no 
longer meets their priorities or to incur the costs of moving. Both are 
costly. Zoning can help protect the interests of housing consumers who 
selected a place for a particular set of characteristics by constraining 
the pace of change.158 This is zoning simply as a brake on change, not 
in the service of any particular agenda.  
III. ENACTING INCREMENTALISM 
People resist fast change more than slow, accretive change. 
Opposition to development is often based, in part, on concerns over the 
next project—the slippery slope of community change. People often 
unreasonably expect zoning to protect the status quo and prevent all 
change to neighborhood character. But they are reasonably concerned 
if local officials grant variances or reasonings too easily, undermining 
 
 152. See id. at 21–22 (describing the model Tiebout created for the Tiebout Hypothesis). 
 153. Tiebout, supra note 150, at 418. 
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stability in expectations. A useful focus, then, is on zoning tools that 
regulate the pace of change.  
The first and most obvious tool is concurrency, or adequate 
public facilities ordinances.159 Concurrency is a land use regime that 
imposes phased expectations of growth.160 Adopted most notably in 
Florida in the 1980s, concurrency was designed to ensure that 
development did not outpace infrastructure capacity.161 In essence, a 
concurrency regime requires local governments to plan for reasonable 
expansions of infrastructure, like roads and wastewater (or even 
schools), and then limit development in any given year to levels 
consistent with those infrastructure plans.162 Importantly, however, 
developers could buy their way out of concurrency caps by paying 
directly for additional infrastructure capacity.163 For example, a 
municipality might plan for extending sewer lines to an area to serve 
five hundred additional housing units, to be paid from general property 
tax revenue. If a developer wanted to build one thousand units (or any 
additional units once the five hundred new ones had already been 
permitted), the developer would have to pay a kind of impact fee to 
expand the sewer beyond what had been planned.164 
The purpose of concurrency was not to limit growth for the sake 
of preserving community character. Rather, it was to bring a degree of 
rationality and planning to infrastructure buildout.165 It also served 
fiscal purposes, forcing developers to shoulder some of the cost of 
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infrastructure expansion beyond that which was preplanned.166 
Although, this of course created perverse incentives for local officials to 
adopt infrastructure planning that was too conservative precisely to 
shift those costs.167  
Nevertheless, concurrency (and the related adequate public 
facilities doctrines) is one of the few land use regimes that focuses 
explicitly on the pace of change, not simply on the amount of change.168 
As a result, concurrency can be easily repurposed to ensure that growth 
does not outpace community expectations for stability instead of merely 
infrastructure capacity. Local governments should engage in planning 
not just around the amount of development to permit but also the 
timing of that development in order to navigate the thin path between 
encouraging development and protecting stability. 
The risk, of course, is that when municipalities adopt plans for 
growth, they will plan for much too little growth. They will err on the 
side of protecting expectations of in-place owners and will do very little 
to address the acute problems that restrictive zoning can create.169 
There must be a stick as well as a carrot. Courts and state legislatures 
have developed many approaches to this problem, from builder 
remedies to assigning fair share obligations.170 There is no need to 
rehash those here, and most have proven ineffectual or problematic.171 
But states have the power to force deals.172 They could, for example, 
threaten more sweeping land use reforms if local officials fail to plan for 
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adequate change, eliminating single-family zoning or allowing 
increased density as of right.173 In-place property owners and the local 
officials responsive to them might well prefer a kind of phased growth 
model to losing control altogether. The details are beyond the scope of 
this short essay. The point is simply that concurrency regimes provide 
a model for regulating the pace as well as the amount of growth.  
Likewise, the idea of a “zoning budget,” set forth by Professors 
Rick Hills and David Schleicher, can be conscripted to the pace of 
change.174 As they insightfully argued, local officials typically consider 
zoning decisions piecemeal.175 Given the concentrated interests of 
neighbors in resisting nearby development, local officials often bend to 
pressure to down-zone property without regard for the overall 
systemwide effects of too many down-zonings.176 Hills and Schleicher 
therefore proposed a zoning budget, according to which each down-
zoning would have to be accompanied by a corresponding up-zoning 
elsewhere.177 This creates meaningful interest groups aligned on both 
sides of every rezoning and forces local officials to consider some of the 
systemwide consequences of their individual land use decisions.178 
Hills and Schleicher, however, suggest that each local 
government be forced to adopt a zoning budget annually.179 They 
advocate an independent agency, like a local planning commission, to 
set an annual budget.180 That commission would be charged with 
“devising a ratio of up-zonings to down-zonings in light of its zoning 
‘budget.’ ”181 This focus on an annual budget makes sense if the concern 
is responding to dynamic changes in development pressures.182 It 
makes less sense, however, if the focus is expanded to include the value 
of protecting community stability. A longer-term apparatus needs to be 
developed for that purpose. Multiyear, intertemporal bargains over the 
pace of change require zoning budgets lasting beyond a single year. 
Imagine, for example, a ten- or fifteen-year zoning budget, anticipating 
growth and requiring accommodations for development and change but 
giving local officials the ability to decide when that change will occur 
within that long budget cycle. Maybe the dynamic would be the same 
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as with municipal debt, and local officials would push development off 
as long as possible, burdening the future to protect their own 
interests.183 But if people (voters, homeowners) recognize the benefits 
of incremental change—the ability to adapt to new development, the 
opportunity to revisit planning decisions in light of changes on the 
ground, and so forth—then local officials might try to spread the costs 
out over time. At the very least, a longer time horizon for zoning budgets 
could help in managing the pace of change.  
Finally, courts could factor in the pace of change when 
evaluating local zoning decisions. Typically, the proliferation of 
development in a community is viewed as a reason to allow more 
development.184 A number of land use tests—whether under 
constitutional, statutory, or judge-made rules—focus on the treatment 
of others in the community.185 The obvious concern is treating similarly 
situated property owners alike, and courts tend to worry if one property 
owner is allowed to develop in ways that a similarly situated neighbor 
is not.186 But perhaps this is wrong or, at least, incomplete. 
Other developments in a neighborhood are reasons not to allow 
an additional project too quickly out of concern for community members’ 
expectations. The goal is to phase change in more slowly. Courts should 
look at the extent of community change and put a thumb on the scale 
against additional development if change is occurring quickly. How fast 
is too fast when it comes to neighborhood transformation? That depends 
on issues like the transience of the community, the extent of existing 
owners’ expectations around dynamism and change, local and regional 
development pressures, and the like. There is no set formula. But the 
point here is simply that courts can and should examine how quickly a 
neighborhood is changing when evaluating legal challenges to  
new development. 
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CONCLUSION 
Zoning is a wicked problem. The contested stakes, the absence 
of clear goals, and the dynamic interactions between interest groups 
make land use a seemingly inevitable battleground as local officials 
pursue the competing goals of affordability, community preservation, 
environmental protection, economic gains, and others. But at least 
some of these fights can be avoided—or the vehemence diminished—if 
zoning is deployed to manage the pace of neighborhood change, instead 
of the product (or goal) of end-state planning. Using zoning to allow, 
and even encourage, regular but incremental change ensures a measure 
of dynamism while also protecting the expectations of in-place owners—
expectations that adapt more easily to slow and steady changes than to 
quick, avulsive ones. This is not incrementalism because of the 
difficulty of global solutions. Instead, when it comes to land use 
regulations, slow and steady change is itself a kind of solution to the 
wicked problem of zoning. 
 
